



HOME RENAISSANCE FOUNDATION
RENEWING THE CULTURE OF THE HOME

Home Renaissance Foundation

Working Papers

Number 37

Sustainable Living:
Relationality, Ethics of Care, and Service

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March 2011

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Home Renaissance Foundation
Sustainable Living: Professional Approaches to Housework

London, England
March 17-18, 2011

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I. Introduction

In 2007 a mortgage lending crisis set off in the United States soon spread to other sectors of the country's economy and, in the following year, rocked financial markets around the world. And this, despite early warnings and a decade-long debate on the need to reform economic structures of nations and international communities to circumvent financial cataclysm of global proportions (Roubini, 2006; Schiller, 2000). Subsequent analyses of the 2008 recession's precipitating factors list easy credit, speculation in equities and real estate and weak oversight of financial institutions as causes of the global crisis (Faiola, 2010; Weisberg, 2010). Accurate as these analyses may be, the factors cited are not independent forces with their own necessary and inevitable dynamism. Rather, they are the outcome of human choices and actions taken by individuals and groups of individuals. These choices and actions spring from the values and motives of the men and women responsible for them, and suggest that human choices—without due regard for their consequences—precipitated the worldwide catastrophe.

The persistence of the economic crisis demonstrates that the unrestrained competition and self-seeking fostered by individualism is a weak foundation for enduring prosperity. The situation's continuance underscores the inadequacy of modernity's exaltation of the autonomous, purely rational agent whose judgments are based largely on self-interest and abstract reasoning. The choices that brought about the crisis were self-serving and detrimental to others. Responses from some individuals to austerity measures taken by their governments to avert a full-blown depression reflect similarly self-centered attitudes. Actions that cause injury to persons and damage to property only increase the hardship of all involved. The seriousness of the current crisis and its global impact demand that we re-evaluate our self-understanding human beings in order to create conditions that can sustain our own and others' long-term flourishing in the multiple dimensions of our common humanity. As the Carnegie Trust-supported independent Commission of Inquiry into the Future of Civil Society in the UK and Ireland stated in its March 2010 report, future human well-being and environmental sustainability can be achieved in

societies whose foundations rest upon “freedom, responsibility, creativity, initiative and trust” (Commission of Inquiry on the Future of Civil Society in the UK and Ireland, 2010).

Even before the onset of the current crisis, notable representatives of feminist ethics, moral theory and personalist philosophy such as Eva Feder Kittay, Alasdair MacIntyre and Karol Wojtyla had drawn our attention to the radical interdependence characteristic of our species and proposed reasons why and ways in which this reality needs to be incorporated into our self-understanding and the structures of our societies (Kittay, *Human Dependency and Rawlsian Equality*, 1997; MacIntyre, *Dependent Rational Animals*, 1999; Wojtyla, *The Acting Person*, 1979). Drawing on the insights of these thinkers, I will argue that the concept of service, a fundamental reality of human existence but currently a neglected value, must be included in our moral and ethical discussions, public policies and private lives if we are to achieve the twin goals of human well-being and global sustainability that our future demands.

II. Relationality

In his seminal work *Dependent Rational Animals*, Alasdair MacIntyre examines the term “rational animal” typically used to designate the human being in her/his existential reality and deems it inadequate because an overly abstract interpretation of it virtually equates the human person with the Cartesian “thinking substance.” Because such an interpretation fails to take into account human embodiedness and its consequences, MacIntyre has recourse to contemporary findings in cognitive and behavioral science to better understand and explicate in its fullness the “animality” and the “rationality” that characterize our being as human. His analysis enriches our understanding of the similarities between us and other animals, especially the more intelligent species such as chimpanzees and dolphins, in important ways as it also deepens our appreciation of the cognitive and volitional ways in which we fundamentally differ from them (MacIntyre, *Dependent Rational Animals*, 1999).

MacIntyre identifies vulnerability and dependency as the key similarities between humans and other animals that have hitherto been largely ignored in our understanding of what it is to be human. Because of our embodiedness, we, like other animals, are vulnerable to injury, illness,

disability and the consequences of age. Our individual and collective flourishing depends on our cooperation with other human individuals and groups of individuals in many of the ways characteristic other species as well. Consequently, MacIntyre posits, we must expand our notion of being human to include the very real dependence and interdependence inherent in our species as part of the animal kingdom. As a corrective, he offers “dependent rational animal” as a more accurate designator for beings that are human. And, indeed, it is.

MacIntyre’s revised term has the virtue of underscoring both the rationality and the relationality inherent in the human species that distinguish it from other species. Only human beings can become “independent practical reasoners.” That is, humans experience choice and decision-making in a way that other animals do not. Human beings are capable of recognizing their actions as good, better, best or bad. They can and do look ahead and make provision for contingencies, taking into account the needs and desires of others as well as their own when choosing a course of action. Achieving competence as practical reasoners, however, is not a solitary activity. Rather, it requires a lengthy apprenticeship—from infancy into adulthood at least—and its success depends on and is conditioned by our experience vis à vis other practical reasoners. Importantly, however, though most of us enjoy the free and full use of our various capacities for longer or shorter periods over the course of our life spans, none of us is independent at all times. The consequences of our vulnerabilities—age, illness, disability, lack of developmental or other opportunity, etc.—exert constraints upon us in varying degrees at various times. Some of us cannot use one or more of our capacities at all—periodically, or ever. In those circumstances, we need assistance from others to survive and to flourish. All of us at some times and some of us at all times, even need someone to speak on our behalf, as, for example, in infancy or on account of a cognitive, communicative or other impairment that doesn’t allow us to do so for ourselves. Nor are we ever actually self-sufficient; our flourishing is tied to the flourishing of others in smaller or larger communities (MacIntyre, *Dependent Rational Animals*, 1999). By highlighting the dependence/interdependence that both our physicality and our rationality entail, “dependent rational animal” obviates the possibility of an overly abstract conception of being human that promotes an ethic of individualism and aggressive self-interest, albeit perhaps unintentionally. As MacIntyre points out, the fact of our vulnerability and interdependence when acknowledged, accepted and integrated into our moral philosophy, can

enrich our self-understanding and thereby provide a more accurate framework within which to evaluate the adequacy of our ethical principles.

A brief aside is necessary at this point for the sake of clarity. The philosophy of Immanuel Kant and its derivatives have been a dominant influence in twentieth-century ethical theory. And though Kant attempted to correct the extremes of rationalism and empiricism, his lack of confidence in the capacity of human cognition to grasp things in their existential reality leaves the human person enclosed in the phenomenal without any possibility of reaching the noumenal. Consequently, Kant's assertion that human beings should be considered as ends and not means actually fails to take into account in ethical decision making the real, extra-mental other about whom the moral agent decides in using Kant's principle of universalizability. Therefore, even should the moral agent's will be good (and common experience indicates that no human will is ever absolutely good as Kant requires it to be), his/her decision is made from the point of view of his/her own personal experience and subjectivity without actual consideration of the real situation of the other. Thus, Kantian ethics is compatible with an attitude of self-interest and self-assertion that can foster the sort of subjective pragmatism capable of bringing about the kind of financial upheaval whose consequences we now bear.

This aside casts into relief the importance of MacIntyre's contribution to a better understanding of what it is to be human and brings to light a number of virtues integral to our individual and common flourishing. To become "independent practical reasoners,"—MacIntyre's term for mature moral agents—capable of participating in "relationships of giving and receiving" that respect the rights and ends of others as well as our own, we need to develop not only what MacIntyre terms the "virtues of independence"—justice, temperateness, truthfulness and courage—but also, the qualities and attitudes he calls the virtues of "acknowledged dependence," epitomized by "just generosity." (MacIntyre, *Dependent Rational Animals*, 1999) These latter virtues are those incumbent upon us if we admit the mutual dependence inherent in our being human. Just generosity, according to MacIntyre, is the virtue that enables us to give others more than is strictly their due in both ordinary circumstances and at times of need, confident that they and/or others will respond to us with the same dispositions in both ordinary and extraordinary times. To be a virtue, a way of typically thinking, choosing and acting, just generosity requires

significant effort on the part of each of us as well as a society so ordered as to facilitate the living of that virtue. In other words, our relationality needs to be understood as the value that it is and fostered in both the public and private spheres.

Just generosity, for MacIntyre, is not to be identified with either cold rationality of the generalized Kantian imperative nor with merely Humean moral sentiments. It, rather, presupposes that we have mastered, integrated and habituated our “affections, sympathies and inclinations” into an “attentive and affectionate regard” for others based upon recognition of the capacities and vulnerabilities of our shared humanity. It is comprised of a number of other virtues including, in MacIntyre’s terms, friendship, “the virtue of taking pity,” and “the virtue of doing good.” Friendship means learning to view the other’s situation from her/his point of view in order to respond by not only meeting the demands of justice, but doing so free of any merely *quid pro quo* motivation while exceeding those demands. “The virtue of taking pity,” implies compassion, kindness, empathy and forgiveness, while “the virtue of doing good” entails acting with goodwill, consideration, and understanding to friends and strangers, to those in need as well as those who are not, but especially to those whose need is pressing (MacIntyre, *Dependent Rational Animals*, 1999).

The kind of society whose citizens practice the “virtues of independence” and those of “acknowledged dependence,” will give all practical reasoners the opportunity to participate in discussion and decision-making on all issues pertaining to their common ends and good. Its norms will respect and foster the practice of just generosity and permit capable practical reasoners to speak and act on behalf and as the voice of those whose dependency needs limit their own ability to do so, thus conferring on them political recognition and participation.

III. Ethics of Care

Like MacIntyre but approaching the issue from another starting point, twentieth-century feminist thinkers also recognized the need to review the adequacy of an ethics that did not explicitly address human interdependence. Their efforts to develop a normative ethics that accepts dependency as part of human reality contributed importantly to what has come to be called the

“ethics of care.” Eva Feder Kittay’s contributions to ethics of care deserve particular attention. Kittay takes issue with the widely accepted meaning of justice as “fairness” in the Kantian-inspired and currently influential theory of justice elaborated by John Rawls. Rawlsian justice promotes a system of fair cooperation in which all and each cooperating participant “benefit[s], or share[s] in common burdens, in some appropriate fashion judged by a suitable benchmark of comparison.” (Kittay, *Human Dependency and Rawlsian Equality*, 1997) “Justice” thus conceived, Kittay points out, ignores the reality of human dependency and implies that those incapable of shouldering the burdens of society equally do not share an equal right to its benefits. In other words, it unrealistically leaves those in some way limited by their vulnerability (age, physical or mental disability, etc.) without the rights of full membership in society—recent recognition of the rights of disabled persons notwithstanding. To be just, Kittay asserts, a well-ordered society is obliged to address this inequity so that none of its members is deprived of the opportunity to flourish within the horizon of her/his potential (Kittay, *Human Dependency and Rawlsian Equality*, 1997; Kittay, *Dependency, Difference, and a Global Ethic of Longterm Care*, 2010).

To remedy this lacuna, Kittay advocates adding to our social ethics “...a concept of interdependence that recognizes a relation not so much of reciprocity as of nested dependencies...” (Kittay, *Human Dependency and Rawlsian Equality*, 1997) The ethical principle based on this concept Kittay states in the following words: “*Just as we have required care to survive and thrive, so we need to provide conditions that allow others—including those who do the work of caring—to receive the care they need to survive and thrive.*” (Kittay, *Human Dependency and Rawlsian Equality*, 1997) Kittay’s contributions to the discussion of dependency and social justice deserve further attention. A society characterized by the “virtues of acknowledged dependence” as well as the “virtues of independence” as described above would, consequently, be more capable of promoting social justice, equal opportunity and protection for the most vulnerable among us. It would leave none of its members out of discussion and decision-making on all issues pertaining to their common ends and good, nor would it exclude any from participation in the benefits thereof. It would also be more likely to be proactive in dealing with social change rather than reactive once change has occurred. Two practical examples illustrate this point: one instance regards the situation of professional women

in the workforce; the other, the plight of many paid or unpaid caregivers in the US (and perhaps other nations as well).

Though opportunity for women in the public sphere has expanded over the last half-century, that expansion has not been addressed holistically by society. For example, the US Bureau of Labor statistics reports that women make up more than two-thirds of the employees in ten of the 15 job categories likely to expand vigorously during the next decade (The Economist, 2009). “More opportunities for women!” we might think. A 2009 study by the Center for Work-Life Policy points out, however, that childcare issues continue to be the reason 74% of women take the off-ramp from professional life (Goudreau, 2010). Kittay’s work has highlighted the special impact of dependency care upon women, the consequences of which society has only begun to address. In addition, as Kittay points out, many women bear the primary responsibility for elderly parents, disabled spouses or other family members with dependency needs. Since some aspects of dependency work are most adequately carried out only by women, the number of women balancing family and work is projected to increase (Kittay, *Dependency, Difference, and a Global Ethic of Longterm Care*, 2010; Kittay, *Love’s Labor. Essays on Women, Equality, and Dependency*, 1999; Kittay, *Human Dependency and Rawlsian Equality*, 1997). Add to this the need for two incomes to maintain a satisfactory standard of living for many families, and questions of social justice and care of the most vulnerable come into sharper focus. Not only will the “brain drain” on the workforce continue, but more women will likely experience greater stress as a result of their effort to balance work and family responsibilities (United States Department of Labor, 2010).

The situation of paid or voluntary caregivers points up another instance in which an ethics of care would be helpful in addressing a very real difficulty that is likely to become more common as our global population ages. The most typical example of this difficulty is that of a woman caring for one or more persons with dependency needs—children, a disabled spouse, elderly parents or relatives. Unless she can afford to pay other caregivers or find voluntary ones within her family or community, she usually encounters serious difficulty taking adequate care of her own legitimate needs—for example, of rest, personal care, and so forth. If she must work outside her home besides, the burden often takes its toll not only on the woman herself, but on

family relationships, other family members, and/or on her professional work. Poorer women (and their families) are more acutely subject to such stress because most of these women are less educated, less skilled and less able to profit from opportunities for advancement than their wealthier counterparts. Many of them are immigrants trying to establish themselves in a new society and culture while supporting the families they left behind. Given no further attention, these unresolved difficulties will deprive the public sphere of the full contribution women can make and continue to leave unaddressed the very real needs of caregivers and those in their charge. Indeed, in the longer term, they may even add further costs to the healthcare and entitlement programs already feeling the strain of the current economic downturn. And we must not forget that, although care of dependents has most often been done by women, some men also find themselves in a similar position. Think, for example, of the husband whose wife is incapacitated by illness. Though some of her care may be delegated to others at times, he is the one primarily responsible for her care and for the care of their dependent children as well.

Kittay's call for the development of an "ethics of care" that takes into account "dependency work" and its values—"connection, attentiveness and responsiveness to the need of another, a sense of responsibility for the well-being of another, [and] concern for particular others" will, as she maintains, "become especially valuable resources in considering a global ethics of long-term care" (Kittay, *Dependency, Difference, and a Global Ethic of Longterm Care*, 2010). Echoing MacIntyre, Kittay rightly asserts that now is the opportune moment to reassess our social institutions and values, and to revise our ethics so that we "create societies in which trust, real fellowship, and real difference can coexist" (Kittay, *Dependency, Difference, and a Global Ethic of Longterm Care*, 2010).

IV. Service

Implicit in MacIntyre's discussion of "acknowledged dependence," Kittay's ethics of care, and the UK Independent Commission's report is the notion of service as a fundamental aspect of being human. MacIntyre's "just generosity" is, in part, fruit of the "connection, attentiveness and responsiveness to the need of another" intrinsic to Kittay's ethics of care. The trust among

members of a society that the UK Commission recognized as essential to stable societies and growing economies also rests on individuals' collectively living the "just generosity," attentiveness and responsiveness to as well as sense of responsibility for the needs of others discussed by MacIntyre and Kittay. But what exactly is this value and virtue called "service"?

In the relationships characteristic of dependent rational animals, we give and receive tangible and intangible goods and perform actions useful or helpful to one another—voluntarily or for pay, intentionally or not—in order to create the conditions necessary for our own well-being and that of others. In other words, insofar as we fulfill a purpose, play a role or execute a function in each other's lives, we render service to one another ("Service", 2010; "Service", 2010). This is simply a fact of the human condition; however, as practical reasoners, we have the option of acknowledging or ignoring this fact. Rejecting or failing to acknowledge the reality that we serve each other means leaving undeveloped one of our human potentials, just as failing to develop courage or justice would do. And just as courage and justice are fundamental to the flourishing of individuals and societies, so is service which, as an habitual attitude or predisposition to action, might more accurately be termed the "spirit of service." Consequently, acknowledging that we are dependent rational animals requires that we also acknowledge the fact of serving one another as inherent in our humanity and cultivate the spirit of service as the positive value for human flourishing that it in fact is. To do otherwise would be to leave our ethics incomplete and faulty with the consequences that doing so would entail.

To understand the value and virtue called "service," however, it is necessary to differentiate "service" from the cognates "servitude" and "slavery" for, despite its use to denote positive and even noble realities as, for example, in reference to diplomacy, military service, public service or worship, the term carries strong negative connotation. This is true especially when "service" is used in reference to tasks involved in taking care of the basic needs of the human person such as those carried out by sanitation employees, cleaning personnel and stay-at-home mothers. Though "service," "servitude" and "slavery" all derive from *servus*—the Latin word for servant, serf, or slave—they are not in fact synonymous ("Servus", 2010). Servitude or slavery refers to the coerced instrumentalization of one human being by another. Because the effect of this coercion is the provision of a good or service that fosters the well-being or fulfills the desires of the one

who coerces. Because of the historical reality of slavery and its evils, the negative connotation of the word “service” has unfortunately overshadowed its positive meaning and led to disregard of service as a noble reality and as a virtue.

Fortunately, over time the word “service” is becoming disencumbered of some of its negative connotations. This can be seen in the contemporary valuation of professions and occupations in fields such as consultancy, information technology, and health care. In the last decade of the twentieth century, for example, the fact that our interdependence entails service has given rise to the evolving interdisciplinary field called “service science,” whose object is to harness the latest technology and systems management for the benefit of sustainable growth and development. Jim Spohrer, Director of Services Research for IBM, in the inaugural issue of the online journal *Service Science* (2009), urged that the term “service” be used not for “the historic economic notion of intangible product, unproductive labor, or low value work, but rather, to designate “the glue that holds the world together” because service, he posits, is “the best way of fostering stable and sustainable social and economic conditions at both the local and global levels” (Spohrer, 2009). Though the discipline of service science deals with providing goods and services, its object is to enhance the receiver’s experience of both the goods and products as well as the provision of these. In this respect, service science is an example of both the reality and the valuation of the virtue of service. Indeed, service, in the sense of the spirit of service, is the attitudinal and active manifestation of the interdependency that characterizes the human species not only its material but in its other dimensions as well. Its practice gives rise to the solidarity that unites people in the generous mutual support that is the condition for their pursuit of the common good without neglect of the individual.

The spirit of service springs from the same source as does just generosity, is implicit in MacIntyre’s description of that virtue and is, I believe, its motivating factor as we shall see in the course of this discussion. As “independent practical reasoners”—MacIntyre’s term for mature moral agents—we can choose whether or not we will act and the reasons for which we will or not do so. We deploy our rational powers to make or do specific things, to create certain conditions, to achieve particular goals, etc. By virtue of the interdependence and reciprocity inherent in our human condition, our choices and actions extend their effects to other individuals

and to the groups of which we form part, whether we intend that they do so or not. Consequently, understanding ourselves as dependent rational animals entails recognizing others as other selves as well on account of our shared humanity. This implies that our relationality entails respecting others as goods, ends, in themselves, just as we are, and never as a means to achieving some goal of our own or some objective of the collectivity.

As MacIntyre further points out, by the very fact of being human, we are indebted to each other (MacIntyre, *Dependent Rational Animals*, 1999). We come into existence and develop to the state of flourishing we achieve on account of the help of others—parents, teachers, mentors, spouses, friends, etc. We, therefore, owe them a debt for their generosity to us. Because we cannot always repay each individual in kind—we cannot, for example, take care of our parents in exactly the same ways or to the degree to which they exercised care for us—we all find ourselves more in debt than we can pay. Though we do try to repay others for the good they have done to us, we never achieve parity in all respects of our indebtedness. The way we can discharge this obligation, however, MacIntyre asserts, is by paying it forward—that is, by living what he terms “generalized reciprocity,” doing good to others because they are other selves capable of receiving what we can give.

The virtue of service is the habit that facilitates our living this generalized reciprocity. It can be described as a habitual awareness of the needs of others and a cheerful, willing giving of ourselves—of our time, talents, interest, attention, possessions, etc.—to them in order to promote their flourishing as we would our own, both in the ordinary circumstances of everyday life as well as in their times of greater need. The virtue of service cultivates in us the habit of looking outward at others and translating intention into actions that manifest our acceptance of what we are—“dependent rational animals”. And this habit is crucial if we are to acknowledge and embrace our mutual dependence. Because the awareness of our felt needs and wants is very direct, however (as it is in other members of the animal kingdom), our capacity to look outside of ourselves at others and actively promote their flourishing as well as our own requires effort. It requires the personal integration Karol Wojtyła calls self-possession (Wojtyła, 1979). It is this self-possession that allows us to act as responsible independent practical reasoners in cooperation with others to achieve the good of communities and societies.

Understanding and development of this self-possession is vital if we are to live the virtues of acknowledged dependence. Our decisions and actions reveal something of who we are and of who we are becoming, if we pay attention to them, because they are rooted in our convictions and in the attitudes that spring from them. Fundamentally, our convictions and attitudes reflect the degree to which we accept our existential reality as dependent rational animals. The more we align our decisions and actions with that reality, the more integrated we become as persons. As Wojtyła explains, however, this integration develops from the effort to recognize the various stimuli affecting us from events outside of ourselves as well as from within and transcending them—that is, holding a decision in abeyance—so that we can distinguish and prioritize the values in play in the light of truth in order to consciously and freely undertake a course of action. The integration of the person takes place, Wojtyła maintains, at this moment when we commit ourselves and direct the energies of body and mind to achieving the most important value. Such integration does not suppress or repress the legitimacy of the other values in play, but directs the drive that would have gone into their pursuit to achieving the value most aligned with the truth (Wojtyła, 1979).

Development of such personal integration is crucial to sustainability at every level because it is the necessary foundation for living the “virtues of independence” and those of “acknowledged dependence”. It unites the force of our rational and affective dynamisms, enhances our openness to values and strengthens our capacity to commit ourselves to their achievement. It also diminishes the likelihood that we succumb to the inducements of individualism and totalism (Wojtyła, 1979), mere caricatures of independent practical reasoning incapable of fostering the flourishing of each and of all.

Though Kittay is hopeful about “the possibility of building the society visionaries have dreamed of, one that recognizes commonality and respects difference” (Kittay, *Dependency, Difference, and a Global Ethic of Longterm Care*, 2010), MacIntyre is less sanguine on that point. He points out that being human, we make mistakes, our individual and collective reasoning is not flawless (MacIntyre, *Dependent Rational Animals*, 1999), and we sometimes fail to respond to values. In his view, neither the modern nation-state nor the individual nuclear family is capable

of being such a society. Nation states, he contends, are governed by professional and semiprofessional politicians in concert with a small, politically active minority. And, though apprenticeship in the both sets of virtues does begin in the family, MacIntyre believes that individual families are too liable to influence from prevailing social attitudes to do the job on their own. In his view, networks of local communities that practice the virtues of independence and acknowledged dependence are the best, if nevertheless still imperfect, means of getting the larger society and the nation to address the needs and promote the flourishing of each and all of its members (MacIntyre, *Dependent Rational Animals*, 1999).

Certainly, such local communities can be powerful nurturers and sustainers of the “virtues of acknowledged dependence” and powerful models for the benefits of acquiring these habits. Ultimately, however, the degree to which these qualities characterize a community or society of any size depends upon the self-determination of the individuals of which it is comprised and their ability as practical reasoners to live virtue. Because we are not self-sufficient, we achieve our individual and common goods and purposes in cooperation with others. So do most other animals. Human participation in pursuit of common ends, however, is different from mere group action. It depends on each individual’s personal integration, as described above, and upon the freely developed disposition to take part in realizing the common good. Wojtyła calls this participation “solidarity,” which he defines as the pursuit of our own flourishing accompanied by a willingness to go beyond the demands of our role in achieving the common good when that is needed. To some degree, living solidarity within the communities of which we form part is actually living the virtue of service as earlier described. It implies respect and care for the good of each individual as we pursue the good of all because it has room for loyal opposition. A community of persons intolerant of dissent is a community without respect for its members as independent practical reasoners. An individual unwilling to play a role in achieving the common good in solidarity with others demonstrates willful or, at the least, unwitting ignorance of what it means to be human.

Otherwise, as Wojtyła demonstrates, it is difficult to avoid the twin dangers of individualism and totalism, both of which vitiate our ability to flourish personally and collectively (Wojtyła, 1979). Individualism, on the one hand, impedes acknowledgement of our dependency and sets us at

opposition to one other in defense of our personal freedom and well-being vis à vis its limitation by others and results in a breakdown of our common good. Totalism, on the other, subsumes the flourishing and freedom of individuals to the goals of the community or of a powerful elite that controls it, using force when necessary, to defend the perceived common good from the threat of individual self-determination (Wojtyla, 1979). We have experienced the negative fruits of both these possibilities during the twentieth century and seen that neither approach fosters acceptance of ourselves as the dependent rational animals that we are, nor the sustainable growth and development our being human deserves.

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